Philosophy
in the twentieth century has been characterized by its attempt to give an account of the meaning of both words and sentences of language.
The goal of such effort is to render philosophical questions and their proposed answers as clear and precise as possible.
In this way it is believed that many philosophical difficulties may be resolved.
It is in this tradition that we find Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Whatever else this work may be, it is certainly a major work in the philosophy of language. In this paper I will examine this philosophy of language and suggest that it may be interpreted as and a predicate 'is broken*. The meaning of 'the broom' is the broom and 'is broken' is predicated of the broom.
If this agrees with reality the sentence is true; if not, then it is false. The use of the sentence plays no part in any of this and for this reason Wittgenstein rejects the analysis.
How can we use the above sentence? To use the examples mentioned by Wittgenstein, I can use it to 'describe the appearance of an object', to report on a situation, to speculate about a situation, to form an hypothesis, as a line in a fictional story, as the punch-line of a joke and many other uses.' By considering these varied uses one sees that the meaning of the sentence will change depending upon the use it is put to.
That is, the language game being played is a central factor in how the sentence is to be understood. Suppose that the sentence 'the broom is broken' was used as a warning not to use the broom.
The realist account which amounts to describing a 'picture' of a broken broom will absolutely fail to convey the meaning as a warning.
Once the sentence is understood as a warning, the realist account may give the necessary additional information needed to express the sentence's meaning, but not before.
Realist, truth-condition, theories of meaning don't recognize the distinctions of meaning that different language games impose on language.
The 
Briefly,
for the realist to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions under which it would be true.
But to know this amounts to knowing when it is correct to assert the sentence.
Since some sentences do not admit of such knowledge, one cannot say that they are true nor know their meaning. A similar argument goes through for purported falsehoods that are undecidable.
What Wittgenstein's arguments do, then, is deny the principle of bivalence; for it entails the truth of the LEM in every case, but for some sentences the LEM is not true (which isn't to say that it is false).
If the LEM is not true, then the principle of bivalence is not true either. The key to his argument is that meanings must be public;
i.e. one must be able to manifest knowledge of meaning if one has such knowledge at all. So, when we combine the two lines of argument we get the following view of the realist theories of meaning: (1) they are incapable of determining the language game being played for a particular utterance of a sentence and hence not yielding the correct meaning of the sentence in that game; (2) even within a predetermined language game the realist theories of meaning yield contradictions, the LEM is both true and not true. It is not hard to see why Wittgenstein wants to reject any such realist theory of meaning.
A great deal follows from this. Much of the socalled private language argument comes from the rejection of the principle of bivalence, for it is then no longer legitimate to assert sentences like 'Either he is in pain or he is not whether we can tell or not'. Other areas of philosophy are affected as well. We get hints about the philosophy of mathematics in Wittgenstein's examples about the sequence '777' occurring in the expansion of pi.
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Namely, mathematical arguments such as 'Either 777 occurs or it does not.
If it does, then C. If not, then C. Therefore, C.' would no longer be valid.
It appears to follow as well that quantification over undecidable domains would also be disallowed.
Generally, any philosophical position that presupposes a world independent of language (i.e. of us) cannot be acceptable.
The rejection of realist theories of meaning also suggests a new job for philosophy (perhaps the only one). When philosophical problems arise the philosopher probably is invoking a realist theory of meaning. By 'breaking' this 'flybottle' with this anti-x*ealist argument one resolves a great many philosophical problems.
Having considered Wittgentein's negative theses about certain theories of meaning I want to move on to see if there is a positive side to the philosophy of language presented in the Investigations. I want to suggest that although he clearly does not offer any such theory of meaning explicitly, Wittgenstein's criticisms of realist theories of meaning implicitly contain the basic elements of an adequate (on his own grounds) theory of meaning which one could call 'antirealist' .
Recall that Wittgenstein's arguments against realist theories of meaning fell into two groups. There were the arguments concerning the inability of these theories to handle different language games. And there were the arguments which rule out any theory invoking the principle of bivalence. Let us look at each group separately.
When one sets out to give a theory of meaning for a language one clearly wants one for the entire language; since it is impossible to isolate a fragment of language for study. Thus, when we construe the realist theories of language as theories for the entire language we run afoul of the fact that a given sentence may be used for a variety of purposes. Consequently, the meaning of the sentence will vary from language game to language game. The realist theories, however, did not capture this variation in meaning since they specified meaning strictly in terms of reference and truth-value.
Is there any way to reformulate these realist theories so that they can work for the entire language? One proposal that seems quite natural to make is to have some part of the theory of meaning itself determine the language game within which the utterance is made and then appropriately transform the sentence into another sentence which, when analysed in terms of So, one adds on to the theory to make it do 'such and so'. The second objection is more profound, however.
It is not that the principle of bivalence fails to deal with certain features of language. Rather,through our language who bring the world into reality.
